The Rationale
Recognizing the urgency of the situation, President Davis invited General Lee to Richmond for a three-day meeting with his cabinet on May 26. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss their plans and devise a strategy to turn the tide of the war. It is crucial to understand the significance of the Battle of Gettysburg within the broader context of the war. It was seen as a final attempt to secure victory on the battlefield. General Lee aimed to provoke a large-scale battle that could potentially be decisive. The intention was to divert attention from the Western Theater and instigate a battle in the East that could alter the war's trajectory. Building on his previous victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Lee proposed taking the war into Northern territory. While General Grant was closing in on Vicksburg, there were discussions about detaching General Longstreet's corps and sending them to assist General Pemberton. However, it was increasingly apparent that Vicksburg was already lost. Lee suggested the alternative: retain Longstreet in his army and launch an invasion of Pennsylvania, hoping to achieve a breakthrough.
There were two main objectives in mind for this operation. Firstly, it aimed to remove the war from central Virginia during the summer months. Additionally, the hope was to secure a victory in a battle north of the Mason-Dixon Line, which would potentially lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by France and Britain. Another crucial objective was to provide the Army of Northern Virginia with essential resources such as food, forage, horses, and other supplies from the fertile farmlands of Pennsylvania. This was necessary as the Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments were struggling to meet the increasing demand due to the blockade's significant impact. Alongside these objectives, there were several other goals to be achieved. These included diverting the Union Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock River line, disrupting any offensive plans General Joseph Hooker may have had, driving Union occupation forces out of Winchester and the lower Shenandoah Valley, drawing Union forces away from other theaters, and ultimately dealing a decisive blow to Northern morale.
Lee's unwavering confidence in his army led him to believe that if he could secure advantageous terrain, the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) would triumph over the Army of the Potomac (AoP). This perception fueled his hope that such a victory would compel the war-weary North to seek peace, potentially serving as a decisive military maneuver to showcase the Southern will for independence to Great Britain and France.
However, Lee's strategic approach was marred by a series of misconceptions regarding the state of morale in the North, which ultimately shaped his flawed strategy and resulted in miscalculations. One of these misinterpretations was his misunderstanding of Northern sentiment, as he mistakenly believed that the general public in the North was fatigued by the ongoing conflict. Consequently, he failed to grasp the unwavering determination of the Lincoln Administration to persevere in the face of adversity. This misjudgment of the North's resolve played a significant role in shaping Lee's flawed assumptions and strategic decisions.
Reorganization
Following Chancellorsville and the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson, General Lee undertook a significant reorganization of his forces. To strengthen his army, Lee decided to create three Corps instead of the previous two. As part of this restructuring, he promoted AP Hill to command the newly formed 3rd Corps, while Richard Ewell assumed leadership of the 2nd Corps. James Longstreet remained in charge of the 1st Corps.
Before the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee's army had suffered significant losses in terms of both brigade and regimental commanders. Out of the 28 brigades that participated in the Chancellorsville campaign, a staggering nine of them lost their commanders during the battle. Furthermore, three of these brigades experienced the loss of multiple commanders. Additionally, the ANV lost 64 out of its 130 regimental commanders. Consequently, many of Lee's brigades entered the Gettysburg campaign with inexperienced unit commanders, which would have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the battle.
As part of the reorganization efforts, Lee made a crucial decision to disband the army's reserve artillery and redistribute its batteries to the infantry corps. This adjustment allowed each corps to have five artillery battalions at its disposal, granting them the flexibility to assign these battalions to the infantry divisions or retain them under the command of the corps. Although this change in the command structure may have appeared insignificant at first glance, it would prove to have significant implications on July 3rd, during the Battle of Gettysburg.
Was the ANV Designed for a Northern Invasion?
Lee's Army was not designed to leave the confines of Virginia due to several factors. Firstly, Lee had limited intelligence operations compared to his Union counterparts. Instead of having a dedicated intelligence service like the Bureau of Military Intelligence, Lee relied on three main sources for information: the civilians of Virginia, Stuart's Cavalry, and his staff. However, when Lee moved north, he left behind his most valuable intelligence source - the civilians of Virginia. These civilians not only provided crucial information but also aided in the communication and navigation of local roads and geography. This decision may have been influenced by the fact that Lee heavily relied on his cavalry for intelligence and did not trust information from other sources. This deficit in intelligence gathering put Lee at a significant disadvantage. The CSA had very few covert operatives in the north. Lee primarily used individual undercover agents to provide intelligence, usually assigned to one of his subordinate generals, most famously Henry Harrison. Lee depended strongly on his cavalry and never trusted actual intelligence from other sources.
Lee may have overlooked the political landscape of the areas he intended to invade. While there were a significant number of KGC operatives and Copperheads in Baltimore, western Maryland, and southern Pennsylvania, these regions were predominantly pro-Union. This meant that Lee would face strong opposition and limited support from the local population in these areas. Overlooking this factor could have further contributed to the challenges Lee encountered when attempting to expand his operations beyond Virginia.
Another limitation was that his staff was too small to plan and coordinate a foray into enemy territory. Lee had a very small staff to manage his corps movements, so when he needed them to regroup, it took several days. These 6 men comprised all of Lee’s staff
· Chief of Staff, Inspector General: Col. Robert H. Chilton
· Chief of Artillery: Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton
· Aide de Camp, Asst. Adjutant General: Lt. Col. Walter H. Taylor
· Aide de Camp, Asst. Military Secretary: Maj. Charles Marshall
· Aide de camp, Asst. Inspector General: Maj. Charles S. Venable
· Engineer Officer: Capt. Samuel R. Johnston
This would repeatedly be a limitation: his command and control at critical moments was inadequate, and he lacked sufficient staff to maintain communications with corps leaders.
Lee faced significant logistical challenges during the Pennsylvania Campaign due to his lack of adequate supply support. Unlike the Union forces, who had the advantage of utilizing railroads and rivers for transportation, Lee had to rely on a primitive system. With no railroads or rivers available to him, Lee's only option was to transport his supplies over land using horse and mule-drawn wagons. This resulted in a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, which posed a major hindrance to his operations.
One of the key issues that Lee encountered was the dependency on a long supply line that relied on horse and mule-drawn wagons. This meant that his forces had to cover a significant distance to transport essential provisions and equipment. The reliance on such a method of transportation not only slowed down the movement of supplies but also made them susceptible to attacks and disruptions along the way.
Lee's forces suffered from a shortage of long-range artillery ammunition, which severely limited their ability to sustain multiple attacks during the campaign. This deficiency became evident during Pickett's charge, where the lack of sufficient ammunition hindered their offensive capabilities. Lee also lacked the availability of pontoons over the Potomac River, which provided a crucial emergency crossing point. This would become evident in his retreat after the battle.
Lee’s heavy reliance on horse and mule-drawn wagons led to a lengthy and vulnerable supply line, insufficient long-range artillery ammunition, challenges in transporting captured goods, and limited emergency crossing options. These logistical challenges significantly impacted Lee's ability to sustain his offensive campaign and ultimately contributed to his setbacks in the Pennsylvania Campaign.
Lee faced significant logistical challenges in transporting supplies to Gettysburg and Harrisburg. The route spanned 125 miles from Winchester, and even more to Harrisburg, requiring wagons pulled by either four horses or six mules. These wagons had a carrying capacity of 2000-2500 pounds but moved at a slow pace of about 3 miles per hour, which could be further reduced by unfavorable road conditions. The animals themselves had substantial needs, with mules requiring 9 pounds of grain, 10 pounds of fodder, and 12 gallons of water daily, while horses needed 14 pounds of grain, 14 pounds of fodder, and 10 gallons of water. Additionally, the animals required horseshoes, which required manpower to apply. The waste disposal issue was also daunting, with each animal producing 10 pounds of manure and 2 gallons of urine daily. Failing to properly care for the animals would result in decreased efficiency, as they would move more slowly and carry less until they eventually broke down, rendering the army immobile. The sheer size of Lee's trains, stretching for dozens of miles, further complicated matters as infantry and artillery had to share the same roads as the wagons, leading to traffic congestion and delays. The meticulous administration of the order of march was necessary to prevent pile-ups at crossroads, requiring significant labor. Overall, these logistical challenges posed a nightmare for Lee, impacting the timing of Longstreet's arrival on the field, the availability of weapons and armaments, the organization of the three corps in battle, and the retreat after the battle.
General Lee relied on an incomplete map during the Battle of Gettysburg, as he did not possess a detailed map of the town itself. The map he had was a product of the efforts of Jedediah Hotchkiss, a topographical engineer, who had been tasked with creating a small-scale map of the region encompassing northern Virginia, central Maryland, and south-central Pennsylvania. Due to the vast scope of the project and limited time, Hotchkiss had to rely on Pennsylvania county maps to complete the map. He meticulously penciled a grid on a heavy watercolor paper and transcribed the map onto this grid, resulting in a visually appealing yet incomplete representation of the area.
The map used by General Lee was crafted on cream-colored paper and featured red pencil lines to denote roadways, blue markings for rivers and streams, and black ink for the names of towns, mills, blacksmith shops, and major topographical features. The attention to detail extended to including the names of every rural resident in impeccable handwriting. However, despite its aesthetic appeal, the map lacked crucial information such as mild declivities, small hillocks, woods, road surfaces, and fording sites. Additionally, it failed to depict the now-famous landmarks of the battle, including Seminary Ridge, Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Little Round Top.
The absence of comprehensive maps placed the ANV at a significant disadvantage, particularly when a thorough understanding of the local geography was crucial. These omissions had consequences during the battle. On July 1, two regiments from Confederate Brigadier General Joseph R. Davis's brigade were lost when his soldiers unexpectedly jumped into an unmapped twenty-foot-deep railroad cut and were subsequently captured by Colonel Rufus R. Dawes's 6th Wisconsin Regiment. On July 2, as Lee strategized to encircle Meade's left flank, his engineer, Captain Samuel R. Johnston, claimed to have ridden to Little Round Top and found it unoccupied. However, the area was teeming with Union troops. Likely, Johnston had mistakenly identified Warfield Ridge or Houck's Ridge as being vacant. Furthermore, when Johnston was tasked with guiding Hood's and McLaws's divisions to the southern end of the battlefield in preparation for an early afternoon assault on the Union left, he had to retrace his steps and march in the opposite direction due to his lack of a map and his misunderstanding of the area's topographical features. Lastly, the map itself did not accurately depict the Round Tops, nor did it adequately represent the undulating and wooded regions east of the Emmitsburg Road, including the terrain surrounding Weikert's and Trestle's farms, Rose's Woods, the Wheat Field, and the valley between Houck's Ridge and Little Round Top.
The Invasion Begins
On June 3rd, the ANV initiated their departure from Fredericksburg, marking the beginning of their movement. The initial phase of their march led them to Culpeper Court House, to advance further to the Shenandoah Valley while being shielded by the cavalry division under the command of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However, the Union cavalry, led by Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton detected Stuart's concentration. Believing that Stuart was planning a raid towards Washington from his right flank, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the commander of the AoP, instructed Pleasonton to cross the Rappahannock River and eliminate the Confederate cavalry.
The Battle of Brandy Station
Taking place on the 9th of June, 1863, the Battle of Brandy Station emerged as the largest cavalry engagement of the Civil War. In a surprise attack at dawn, Pleasonton launched columns across the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and Kelly's Ford. Following the successful crossing at Beverly Ford, the Union troopers launched an assault on Stuart's camp near a rail station known as Brandy Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The Confederate forces swiftly regrouped, and the Union troops encountered fierce resistance at St. James Church and the Richard Cunningham farm. Simultaneously, the Union cavalry divided, with one division advancing towards Brandy Station and the other heading to Stevensburg. The arrival of Union cavalry at Brandy Station posed a threat to Stuart's rear position, prompting him to skillfully maneuver his brigades. The ensuing clash between the two sides occurred in mounted combat on a lengthy, undulating ridge named Fleetwood Hill, situated near the station. Meanwhile, Pleasonton's forces at Stevensburg faced obstacles from Confederate horsemen and were unable to penetrate Stuart's defenses. After enduring fourteen hours of intense fighting, Pleasonton ultimately withdrew from the field.
The Union suffered a total of 907 casualties, including 69 killed, 352 wounded, and 486 missing or captured, out of approximately 11,000 troops. The Confederates had 523 casualties out of about 9,500 troops. Consequently, the battle can be considered inconclusive. Union forces withdrew without discovering Lee's infantry camped near Culpeper, which was the mission assigned to Stuart. Nevertheless, Hooker deduced that if Stuart had ventured that far north, Lee must be planning a further northward movement into Maryland. Consequently, Hooker promptly initiated the movement of the AoP across the Potomac River, well before Stuart commenced his ride around the Union Army. Therefore, many argue that it was a strategic victory for the Union. Stuart, however, contended that the battle constituted a tactical victory for the Confederates since they had fewer casualties, held the field at the end of the day, and successfully repelled Pleasonton's attack. Nevertheless, General Stuart suffered a significant blow to his reputation in the Court of Public Opinion. He fell victim to two surprise attacks, which the cavalry was expected to prevent. The Southern press generally expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome, and subordinate officers criticized Pleasonton for not aggressively defeating Stuart. Although Hooker had ordered Pleasonton to "disperse and destroy" the Confederate cavalry near Culpeper, Pleasonton justified his actions by claiming that he had only been instructed to conduct a "reconnaissance in force toward Culpeper." Consequently, Pleasonton did not gain much reputationally from this battle. It is worth noting that this battle marked the end of the Confederate cavalry's dominance in the Eastern theater of the war. From this point onward, the Federal cavalry grew stronger and more confident. Therefore, from this perspective, it can be considered a limited operational victory for the Union.
The Early Stages of the Campaign
To maintain the illusion that he was still at Marye's Heights in Fredericksburg, Lee had to ensure that Hooker remained unaware of his northward movement. To achieve this, Lee left AP Hill behind and protect Richmond, effectively holding back Sedgwick and the VI Corps. Although Hooker was aware that Lee was on the move, he lacked precise information regarding its route and destination.
Lee's strategic position was precarious, as his forces were dangerously spread out. On June 12th, the Confederate army extended over a vast expanse of 70 land miles, with no direct roads connecting its wings. If Hooker had been privy to Lee's position on that day, the Confederate general would have been highly vulnerable. However, Stuart, the Confederate cavalry commander, skillfully concealed this vulnerability. A series of battles with Union cavalry prevented them from ascertaining the location and strength of Lee's army, thus obscuring its direction and ultimate objective:
Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.
Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.
Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.
Although the movement north is often portrayed as a display of Lee’s cunning while Hooker was deceived, both sides were screened from the other. Both sides were effectively screened from each other. Moreover, it was widely known that Lee intended to invade, prompting Hooker to make numerous attempts to locate the ANV. Maj Gen Sharpe of the BMI had early on suggested that Lee would move in a northwesterly direction, a prediction that proved to be accurate. In light of this information, Hooker dispatched several cavalry patrols in search of Lee. On June 5, Brig Gen John Buford reported Confederate cavalry presence in Culpepper, which led to Sharpe's one error in intelligence assessment, suggesting that the northward movement might only be a cavalry raid. Despite the efforts of brigades led by Gregg, Munford, and Duffie to locate Lee, the Rebel cavalry remained elusive. It is important to acknowledge that Hooker did what he could, but his cavalry ultimately failed to outmaneuver Stuart. With this phase of the campaign concluded Lee was now prepared to cross the Potomac River and proceed into Maryland.
JEB Stuart gets lost
One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was Jeb Stuart’s absence after crossing the Potomac until July 2nd. His absence had significant consequences, as it left Lee without crucial cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence. The lack of information regarding the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions greatly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial stages of the battle. Many historians speculate that if Stuart had effectively screened the front of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee would not have been caught off guard by the proximity of the AoP, and the Battle of Gettysburg might have unfolded differently. Stuart's desire to redeem himself after the surprise attack at Brandy Station and his eagerness to outmaneuver the Union army led him to attempt to circumnavigate the enemy once again. However, his plans were hindered by encounters with Union troops, forcing him to deviate from his intended path and ultimately leaving him unable to effectively screen General Ewell's right flank.
The orders given by Lee to Stuart on June 22 have sparked controversy ever since. Stuart, upon separating from the main force on June 23, was granted permission by Lee to ride around the Union army unhindered, cross the Potomac River, and provide cover for the right flank of Ewell's Corps as it marched north. However, Stuart's movement on June 25 was met with opposition from the Union 2nd Corps near Haymarket, Virginia, preventing him from advancing northward. Despite this setback, Stuart decided to press on. His original intention was to circumvent the Union army by starting from its rear, but to his surprise, the Union army shifted northward, turning his position into its eastern flank. Encountering more Union troops near Fairfax Court House, Stuart was forced to move further eastward and could not turn north until reaching Rowser's Ford on the Potomac River. As a result, Stuart found himself positioned to the east of the Union army, unable to effectively screen Ewell's right flank.
Stuart had taken his three most capable cavalry brigades, leaving the remaining two brigades without strong leadership. Approximately 5000 cavalry troops were left behind with Lee, and the commander of this force was aware that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River between June 25 and 27. However, this crucial information was not relayed to Generals Longstreet and Lee, leaving them without reliable reconnaissance. Stuart did send a dispatch to General Lee on June 27, informing him of Hooker's crossing, but it never reached him. A copy of the dispatch did reach Richmond, but no one there took the initiative to confirm this information with the Commanding General.
Lee specifically instructed Stuart to move northward, protect the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain communication with Lee's forces. It was crucial for Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) informed about the movements and activities of the Union Army, as well as act as a screen to prevent the Union forces from gathering intelligence on Lee's army. Lee emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information, and he also wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and protect Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. However, beyond these instructions, Stuart had considerable discretion in how he accomplished these objectives.
Stuart's interpretation of the orders differed from Lee's intentions due to his ambitions and the allure of bypassing the AoP. Instead of maintaining close contact with Lee's army, Stuart embarked on an extensive raid around the Union forces. Lee had specifically directed Stuart to safeguard the mountain passes with a portion of his force while the ANV was still positioned south of the Potomac River. Subsequently, Stuart was supposed to cross the river with the remaining troops and protect the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. However, Stuart opted for an alternative route, choosing to lead his three best brigades between the AoP and Washington. He proceeded northward through Rockville to Westminster and eventually into Pennsylvania, to seize supplies and cause disruption near the enemy capital. Instead of taking a more direct path north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart decided to reach Ewell's flank by taking his three best brigades, namely those commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (who replaced the injured Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee), between the Union army and Washington. This strategic choice was made in the hopes of capturing supplies along the way and creating chaos near the enemy capital.
Furthermore, despite Stuart's direct orders for Brigadier General Beverly Robertson to join Lee's forces when General Hooker advanced, Robertson displayed a lackadaisical approach to his duties. Instead, Robertson focused on guarding the mountain gaps and the baggage train, ultimately failing to arrive at the battle. The brigades that Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade, which was temporarily attached to the army and more accustomed to partisan activities, as well as the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was regarded as the outcast of the ANV's cavalry command, having previously been dismissed, while Jones, although competent, earned the nickname "Grumble" due to his difficult nature. Lee did not place as much trust in these brigades or their commanders compared to Stuart and the three brigades he chose to accompany him.
Stuart and his three brigades at 1 a.m. on June 25. Unfortunately for Stuart's plan, the Union army's movement to defend Washington and Baltimore was underway, so his proposed route was blocked by columns of Federal infantry, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprived Lee of the use of his prime cavalry force, the "eyes, and ears" of the army while advancing into unfamiliar enemy territory.
Stuart's decision to seize a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was motivated by various factors. Stuart believed that capturing the wagon train would provide the Confederate army with valuable supplies and provisions, such as food, ammunition, and other resources necessary for their operations. Additionally, Stuart may have seen this as an opportunity to disrupt the Union's supply lines, causing panic and confusion among their forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Moreover, capturing such a significant wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It could have been a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and restore his reputation, which had been tarnished by earlier criticisms in southern newspapers. However, it is important to note that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train over gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would have posed a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as emphasizing the importance of acquiring supplies. This interpretation aligns with Lee's campaign objectives and goals, justifying Stuart's actions.
Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army. From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day. Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes included Thoroughfare Gap June 25, Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride note that he faced genuine challenges and required astute tactics to ensure the preservation of his command.
On June 30, General Jubal Early, who would later blame other Confederate generals for the loss at Gettysburg, including Stuart, heard the sounds of battle at Hanover. Despite being aware that Stuart was supposed to be locating him, Early made no effort to ascertain the identity of the combatants. Remarkably, Early was within a mere 5 miles of the battle, and had he made contact, Stuart could have arrived at Gettysburg on July 1.
The Plan of Invasion
The ANV traversed the Blue Ridge Mountains and advanced north through the Shenandoah Valley, capturing the Union garrison at Winchester, in the Second Battle of Winchester, June 13–15, 1863. After crossing the Potomac at Falling Waters, Lee made the strategic decision to divide his forces during their march northward to maintain secrecy regarding their exact location and to sow confusion among the occupied areas. Lee aimed to demonstrate to the people of the North that he held the advantage in the conflict. Additionally, the division of forces was necessary for the procurement of supplies and helped to prevent traffic congestion. It also hinted at Lee's intention to engage in open battle rather than launching a direct assault on a fort or initiating a siege of a city. However, the chosen western route seems indirect if Lee's ultimate goal was to target Baltimore, Washington, or Philadelphia. It is often suggested that Harrisburg was his intended objective, but if so, he was planning on its capture with just one corps. Ewell had swiftly advanced northward towards Harrisburg, while Longstreet remained concealed behind South Mountain until their exit at Cashtown.
However, the AoP was in pursuit and had reached Frederick, Maryland, before Lee realized his opponent had crossed the Potomac. General Hooker had to anticipate a potential attack on Washington or Baltimore. He took measures to defend these crucial locations by mobilizing as many troops as possible. In the absence of concrete information, Hooker made the prudent decision to concentrate his forces and secure the roads leading to the capital to thwart any potential assault. Given the circumstances, Hooker's decision to remain centrally located was the correct course of action.
Meade takes over
After Chancellorsville, calls for Hooker to be replaced were widespread. With Lee on the move, somewhere, and realizing that a major battle was soon to take place, a decision had to be made by Lincoln and Stanton. Darius Couch, as second in command, would have been the obvious choice to replace Hooker, and Lincoln offered him the position. Couch instead resigned his post to create the Department of the Susquehanna, where he brilliantly held off General Gordon with the militia at Sporting Hill on June 30. He recommended Meade instead.
Following Couch's refusal, President Lincoln held a private meeting with Major General John Reynolds on June 2, during which he reportedly inquired about Reynolds' willingness to assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Reynolds, however, expressed his readiness to accept the position only if he could operate independently and free from the political influences that had plagued previous commanders. Understandably, Lincoln could not agree to such a condition, leading to an impasse in their discussion.
The lack of confidence in General Hooker expressed by his senior officers, as well as by General-in-chief Henry Halleck, further exacerbated the situation. Hooker suggested the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and the consolidation of his forces, but his demand to regain control of the garrison or else resign provided Secretary of War Stanton and President Lincoln with the perfect opportunity to accept his resignation. In a moment of impulse, Hooker tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Subsequently, when General Meade assumed command, he immediately made the same request and was granted the authority over the garrison.
Stanton dispatched a civilian engineer, Herman Haupt, his chief of railroads, to oversee the management of the railroads, including the civilian lines. This individual possessed extensive knowledge of the area and coincidentally owned a house in Gettysburg.. On June 30, he informed General Halleck that the Confederates were planning to gather near that vicinity. On July 1, he strategically utilized a single-track line and organized the operation of 5 or 6 10-car trains, one after another, to swiftly transport goods from Baltimore to Westminster. He also instructed Meade's quartermasters to have troops prepared to unload the cargo upon arrival and promptly send the trains back. To ensure effective communication in the absence of functioning telegraph lines, he established a communication line resembling a pony express system that followed the tracks. By July 3, this well-coordinated operation had successfully transported 1500 tons of cargo to the battlefield and returned 2000 wounded soldiers to hospitals in Baltimore. Notably, when President Lincoln delivered his address in November, he traveled by train from Baltimore to Gettysburg on the same line.
Henry Thomas Harrison
On the evening of June 28th, Lee was informed by a spy that Hooker had been replaced by Meade and that Meade was moving toward him. The spy, a diminutive actor who worked with General Longstreet, was known to provide highly accurate information. General Lee had to swiftly adapt his strategies. Recognizing that Meade was a cautious and meticulous commander who was unlikely to make any major errors, Lee needed to devise a more careful plan. The immediate priority was to ensure the concentration of his widely dispersed army, which extended from Chambersburg to Harrisburg. The initial step in this process was to gather his army in a centralized location. Consequently, Lee directed his troops to converge around the crossroads towns of Cashtown and Gettysburg.
Pipe Creek Circular
Meanwhile, Meade decided that his best course of action was to stop looking for Lee and instead let Lee look for him. On June 30, Meade relocated his headquarters to Taneytown, MD, and issued two orders. The first order, known as the Pipe Creek Circular, outlined the construction of a defensive perimeter, while the second order directed a general advance toward Gettysburg starting on July 1. Gettysburg was located between 5 to 25 miles away from each of Meade's seven infantry corps. The Pipe Creek Line served as a defensive barrier to protect against potential attacks on Baltimore and Washington D.C. It also acted as a reserve line in case a retreat from Gettysburg became necessary for the Union forces.
The Pipe Creek Line was positioned just north of Westminster, Maryland, and held strategic importance for the AoP.: the Western Maryland Railroad had its terminus in Westminster, making it the primary supply line for the army in the region, including Gettysburg. Safeguarding this crucial supply route was of utmost importance. The Pipe Creek Line followed Parr Ridge, a significant ridge that stretched from Manchester in the east to Middleburg in the west, running on an east/west axis. Except for some lower ground near Middleburg, the entire position was situated on high ground that was easily defensible. It was believed that this strong position would be nearly impregnable unless Lee could successfully flank it.
The Day Before. Brig Gen John Buford arrived in Gettysburg on the morning of June 30, accompanied by 2 cavalry brigades and approximately 3000 soldiers. Upon his arrival, he was informed by residents that Confederate soldiers were in the vicinity. One of AP Hill's brigades, led by Brig Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew, ventured towards Gettysburg. According to the memoirs of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, Pettigrew was sent to search for supplies, particularly shoes, in the town. With a brigade of 2700 men, Pettigrew conducted a scouting movement. During this movement, he encountered a physician named Dr John O'Neal, who was on a house call. After inspecting O'Neal's medical equipment, Pettigrew inquired about the presence of Union troops, to which O'Neal responded negatively. However, as they approached the town, Pettigrew spotted what he believed to be Union cavalry in the distance. He did not bring on an engagement, as he had been ordered, and returned to Generals Heth and Hill to report.
Confederate Response: When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth about what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Federal force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. It is perplexing to consider why neither General Heth nor General Hill placed trust in Pettigrew's observations. One possible explanation is that both Heth and Hill were relatively new to their positions and had reputations for impulsive decision-making. In terms of practical experience, Heth did not possess significantly more than Pettigrew.
Furthermore, Pettigrew's background as a non-West Pointer from a wealthy family, coupled with his lack of military experience before the war, may have contributed to the skepticism towards his report. Additionally, the fact that Pettigrew's men were freshly outfitted with new uniforms and rifles, and his staff consisted of fellow aristocrats, may have given the impression that they were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the realities of battle. Consequently, Hill may have discounted Pettigrew's interpretation due to these factors, leading to a failure to take his report seriously.
Union Response: In contradistinction, Buford had also spotted Pettigrew’s men. He recognized that he was facing a sizeable force of rebels because they had moved without vedettes as a screen. Buford's identification of a significant enemy presence in the area was taken seriously by his superior, Gen Reynolds. Buford was the ideal individual in the ideal location at the opportune moment. He had attended West Point, was acquainted with many of the generals as school friends, had served in the US First Dragoons, had commanded infantry, and had recently led his cavalry division at Brandy Station and Upperville. His military expertise was highly regarded; Buford and Reynolds had trust and confidence in each other, and their shared experiences at Second Manassas had demonstrated the consequences of disregarding accurate reports from a subordinate. Therefore, when Buford requested close support, Reynolds promptly initiated the advance. The outcome of battles hinges on such intricate details; these specifics determine the victor and the vanquished.
Recognizing that the Confederate movement was originating from the northwest, Buford strategically positioned his men along the roads in this vicinity. Anticipating that any engagement involving his division would serve as a delaying tactic, he dismounted his troopers and stationed them on the low ridges to the north and northwest of the town, aiming to buy time for the army to arrive and secure the advantageous positions to defend McPherson and Seminary Ridges.
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References
· James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1988; and
· https://www.historynet.com/conquer-peace-lees-goals-gettysburg-campaign/
· https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/workspace/handleMediaPlayer?qvq=&trs=&mi=&lunaMediaId=RUMSEY~8~1~26945~1100244
· https://www.historynet.com/were-maps-lees-real-enemy-at-gettysburg/
· Eric J Wittenberg and J David Petruzzi, Plenty of Blame to Go Around. SavasBeattie, 2006.
· Harry W Pfanz, Gettysburg – The First Day. The University of North Carolina, 2010.
· Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. Charles Scribner, 1968.
· Kent Masterson Brown, Meade at Gettysburg. A Study in Command. University of North Carolina, 2021.
· Lloyd W Klein, https://www.rebellionresearch.com/why-did-lee-want-gettysburg-2?fbclid=IwAR3BX-K30era80r4YbpIK7akPaYj4JauC3XoaHZYFtvj8lTQzuQ3v1rfD5c&fs=e&s=cl ;
· https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-were-robert-e-lees-goals-for-invading-pennsylvania-in-1863?fbclid=IwAR02kXsGHSKe992kDLtyFQy41v5igLfai3YrNN6Fb8v9SDFPDJxywT9zKZ0 ; and
· https://www.historyisnowmagazine.com/blog/2023/8/24/logistics-challenges-of-the-army-of-northern-virginia-in-the-gettysburg-campaign
· John B Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War. Louisiana State University Press, 1993.
· Scott L Mingus and Eric J Wittenberg, If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania.Vol1. SavasBeattie 2022.
